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This paper seeks to make a distinction between cognitive processes involved in conflict risk judgment and those involved in conflict avoidance decisions (controllers’ interventions for separation
assurance). First, we conducted a systematic review of the conflict detection literature to identify
studies that focused on conflict risk assessments and studies that focused on conflict avoidance
(intervention). We then report empirical data pertaining to controller intervention judgments. Studies on conflict avoidance have rarely described the intervention decision making process and its
interaction with the conflict risk assessment process, whereas our data indicated differences in
terms of information processing between judgments of conflict risk and intervention judgments.
We provide recommendation for future studies on conflict detection and conflict avoidance. These
findings also have implications for the development of automated conflict detection tools.

Air traffic controllers (ATCos) assure the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of controlled aircraft between a
departure point and a destination. Detecting and resolving potential conflicts between aircraft are the most important
tasks that ATCos perform. To do so, ATCos have to systematically scan the display (radar screen) and check the
trajectories of the aircraft to assess whether a minimum separation is maintained between pairs of aircraft, and if not,
develop and implement a solution that will assure sufficient separation. Conflict detection, which is the first tasks to
achieve to keep the air traffic safe, is a complex and dynamic task that is cognitively very demanding. This task has
been the topic of several studies in the field (for example, Bisseret, 1981; Remington, Johnston, Ruthruff, Gold, &
Romera, 2000; Rantanen & Nunes, 2005; Boag, Neal, Loft, & Halford, 2006; Stankovic, Raufaste, & Averty, 2008;
Loft, Bolland, Humphreys, & Neal, 2009). Several models of conflict detection have also been proposed (among the
most recent are Rantanen & Nunes, 2005; Stankovic et al., 2008; Loft et al., 2009). More general models of
separation assurance which describe both conflict detection and conflict resolution processes have also been
developed but they are less numerous than conflict detection models (see for example Niessen, Eyferth, &
Bierwagen, 1999). We argue in this paper that there are two distinct processes that come to play after initial conflict
detection, one that pertains to judgments of conflict risk and another regarding conflict avoidance (intervention)
decisions, and that great care should be taken not to confound them in experimental tasks or in models of conflict
detection and avoidance.
Conflict Detection
The focus of current theoretical models of conflict detection concerns how controllers determine whether
specific aircraft pairs that have been selectively attended will be in conflict or not. We define conflict as the potential
loss of separation between two aircraft, or a situation where two aircraft would lose separation at some time in the
future should they continue on their present trajectories. Consider two aircraft flying at the same altitude on
converging courses. Determining whether these aircraft will violate lateral separation requires the integration of
speed and distance information to predict the distance or time between the aircraft at the point of intersection of their
trajectories (Law et al., 1993; Loft, Neal, & Humphreys, 2007; Neal & Kwantes, 2009). When aircraft are also
changing altitude (especially in approach control), the prediction of loss of separation in the future also requires the
integration of the vertical speeds and altitudes of aircraft, and the subsequent computation of whether the difference
between aircraft altitudes at the time of the position overlap on the lateral plane are below a minimum separation
(Stankovic, Loft, Rantanen, & Ponomarenko, in press; Xu & Rantanen, 2003). Several theoretical accounts of how

controllers detect conflicts have been published (Loft, Bolland, Humphreys & Neal, 2009; Rantanen & Nunes, 2005;
Stankovic, Raufaste, & Averty, 2008).
In empirical studies of conflict detection, researchers have typically either asked controllers to assess the
risk of conflict between aircraft or to estimate the likelihood that they would intervene on a given aircraft pair to
assure separation, but there has been little consideration of whether these two types of judgment are tapping into the
similar decision process or not.Bisseret (1981) made a distinction between those two cognitive processes thirty years
ago. In his study on decision making made by ATCos, he reported several studies that investigated conflict detection
made by expert ATCos and trainees. In this study, Bisseret distinguished the information processing (risk of loss of
separation) from the decision (intervention) process. Bisseret showed that trainees made more accurate separation
estimations than expert controllers. This particular result has been explained by the safety margins that experienced
controllers apply. Bisseret further hypothesized that experienced controllers are more concerned about succeeding in
their overall control task (which also includes orderly and expeditious flow of traffic) than in the accuracy of their
conflict risk assessments. On the basis of this hypothesis, Bisseret suggested that experienced controllers’ operating
decision process should not be entirely based upon their diagnosis of the air traffic situation. In an earlier study
Bouju (1978) had asked experienced controllers to make a diagnosis (conflict or not) for twelve (six conflict and six
non-conflit) air traffic situations, and to express their intention for intervention (action or not) for the same situations.
Results showed that controllers decided to take actions in nine situations diagnosed as non-conflict, lending support
to Bisseret‘s hypothesis that conflict risk judgments and decisions to intervene are separable.
Stankovic, Neal and Hasenbosch (2010) proposed in a recent study a model of separation assurance that
described five, instead of three, main cognitive processes: (1) information gathering (selection of information), (2)
trajectory anticipation (risk judgments of loss of separation), (3) intervention (decision making about future
intervention), (4) solution choice (selection of conflict solution strategy), and (5) planning (resolution course of
actions). These separation assurance processes are influenced by changes in ATCos’ environment and their strategies.
This study showed the importance of consider all separation assurance processes and their interactions when
studying conflict detection, and in doing so makes a distinction between the conflict risk process (which corresponds
to trajectories anticipation in their model) and the intervention process. Conflict risk consists of a judgment ATCos
make about the loss of separation between aircraft, whereas intervention requires ATCos to decide whether to
intervene or not on a particular pair of aircraft. Recent studies have reported quite different results using the two
questioning methods (risk versus intervention).
Judgment of Conflict Risk
Several experimental studies have asked the participants to judge the risk of conflict between two or more
aircraft. Bisseret (1981) did so when he investigated controllers’ diagnosis process. More recently, Stankovic et al.
(2008) used this method and three specific variables to predict controller judgment of conflict risk, (1) the distance
between the crossing point of the aircraft pair trajectories and the closest aircraft to that point, (2) the distance
between the two aircraft when they are laterally closest, and (3) the lateral distance between the two aircraft when
their growing vertical distance reached 1,000 feet. These variables accounted for up to 50% of the variance in
conflict judgments made by expert controllers. Stankovic et al. asked expert ATCos to judge the risk of conflict
between two aircraft using an 8-pt scale (from “assured airprox” to “no conflict”). Large individual differences in
controllers’ judgments were evident. One group of controllers seemed to be more influenced by a distance that takes
into account vertical separation between aircraft (the lateral distance between the two aircraft when their growing
vertical distance reaches 1,000 feet) when judging the risk of conflict between aircraft than the other group of
controllers.
In a recent study, Stankovic, Loft, Rantanen and Ponomarenko (in press) also reported individual
differences in the effect of vertical separation on conflict risk judgments. In this study, we asked fourteen expert
controllers to judge the risk of conflict between aircraft for situation were four variables (environmental cues) were
manipulated, (1) lateral conflict geometry, (2) vertical separation between aircraft, (3), time to lateral separation
threshold (3 nm), and (4) groundspeed difference between the aircraft. The question used to collect conflict risk
judgment was the same used in the Stankovic, et al. (2008) study, but the scale was different (a 12-pt scale, from “no
risk of conflict” to “extreme risk of conflict”). Results showed that an important effect of vertical separation between
aircraft on controllers’ judgments of conflict risk. Overall, the conflict risk judgments increased as the vertical
separation decreased. Most importantly, we found individual differences in the effect of the vertical separation on
conflict risk judgments. One group of controllers (group 1, N = 7) made lower conflict risk ratings than the other
group of controllers (group 2, N = 7), and the effect of vertical separation on conflict risk judgment was greater for
controllers in group 1 than for the controllers of group 2. Controllers in group1were more experienced (i.e., total
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experience, sector specific experience, older) than controllers in group 2, indicating that experienced controllers were
less conservative and took vertical separation more into consideration than their less experienced counterparts.
Decisions of Intervention
Another experimental task consists in asking participant about their intention to intervene in a situation to
assure separation between aircraft. This was one of the methods used by Bouju (1978). More recently, Loft et al.
(2009) used this method for their study on conflict detection. Like Bisseret (1981), Loft et al. proposed that
controllers use ‘safety margins’ to assure separation between aircraft. These safety margins reflect expectations
regarding likely variation in aircraft trajectory, and also the degree to which controllers are biased to favor safety
over accuracy. Depending on the magnitude of safety margins, controller predictions of aircraft position at specific
points in the future will be some distance closer or further (or higher or lower in the vertical plane) than the positions
predicted by aircraft state values. To test their the theory, Loft et al. (2009) presented to their participants pairs of
aircraft and asked them to provide intervention judgments on a four point scale. A two-parameter computational
model that emulated how controllers approximate aircraft trajectory closely predicted the conflict risk judgments
made by controllers. A key finding reported by Loft et al. (2009) was that there was no variability in risk judgment as
a function of the vertical separation between aircraft. Instead, risk judgment only varied with changes in aircraft
lateral separation. To account for these data, the Loft et al. (2009) model was simplified to assume that controllers
always consider aircraft pairs to be in vertical conflict when aircraft are descending or climbing through the levels of
other aircraft. Loft et al. argued that controllers prefer to intervene to assure aircraft separation when aircraft are
climbing through the levels of other aircraft in order to manage their own workload (Loft, Sanderson, Neal & Mooij,
2007), and thus that their computational model should indeed be able to predict risk judgments without the setting of
a vertical separation safety margin parameter. This result contradicts the effect of vertical separation on conflict
detection reported by Stankovic et al. (in press).
Once ATCos have detected a conflict risk between two aircraft, then they will intervene by instructing one
of the aircraft to maneuver to avoid the conflict (Stankovic, Neal & Hasenbosch, 2010). This risk-intervention
process has been rarely investigated as a unified process except by Bisseret (1981). Researchers have used risk
judgment to examine conflict detection or conflict resolution, but to our knowledge only Bisseret’s study examined
cognitive processes involved in intervention decision. Despite the close relationship between judgment about the risk
of conflict and intervention decision, it is worthwhile to specify the cognitive processes involved in each operation.
This question is particularly urgent as new conflict detection tools that automate the conflict detection process are to
be implemented in the air traffic management (ATM) systems worldwide (for a review see:Neal, Flach, Mooij,
Lehman, Stankovic et al., 2011). Moreover, as showed by Bisseret (1981) intervention actions may occur even if a
situation is diagnosed as non-conflict (cf. Loft et al., 2009).
Some studies on conflict resolution, however, have focused on the type of intervention actions that are
applied by ATCos, once they have decided to intervene on a particular aircraft. For instance, Leroux (1999) defined
three different policies that controllers apply when resolving conflicts according to task load level: (1) “be elegant
first”, (2) “be efficient first”, and (3) “be safe and nothing more”. A good description of how ATCos adapt their
control strategies to anticipated workload and task demands is also provided in Loft et al. (2007).
Recent studies have reported quite different results using the different experimental tasks (judging the risk
of conflict or the likelihood of intervention). For example, Loft, et al. (2009) claimed that there was no variability in
risk judgment as a function of the vertical separation between aircraft, whereas Stankovic et al. (in press) reported an
effect of vertical separation on conflict risk judgments made by expert controllers. The latter showed that controllers’
judgments of conflict risk increased as vertical separation decreased for the half of the participants. In the same study
and in addition to the risk of conflict judgments, Stankovic et al. asked fourteen licensed air traffic controllers (12
men and 2 women) to judge the likelihood by which they will intervene to assure separation between aircraft. Three
questions were asked about three other judgments relating to strategies used to ensure separation, (1) will you
intervene by assigning a new level to the descending aircraft? (2) will you intervene by assigning a new route to the
descending aircraft, or (3) will you intervene by assigning both a new level and a new route to the descending
aircraft. These data on intervention judgments have not been reported before.
First, we compared the three types of intervention (level, heading or both level and heading) to each other
and we found a preference for the level solution compared to the heading solution (t(1,13) = 3.11, p = .002) and to
the both level and heading solution (t(1,13) = 3.23, p = .001). This result is not surprising since in approach control
controllers sequence aircraft for landing and takeoff by using mainly level solution. For this reason we decided to put
together all intervention judgments (level, heading and both level and heading) by keeping the higher scores among
all intervention judgments. We obtained thus just one intervention judgment variable. We used the Tukey for Post hoc

tests and the values for small, medium and large effect sizes of.10, .25 and .40 respectively (Cohen, 1988). One
important result was the significant difference between judgments of conflict risk and intervention judgments, t(1,13)
= 2.85, p = .004. Post hoc tests showed that controllers made higher intervention judgments (M = 9.27, SD = .68)
than conflict of risk judgments (M = 7.30, SD = .53). This result confirmed Bisseret (1981) hypothesis, expert
controllers intervene on pair of aircraft that have been diagnosed not to be in conflict. We also found an effect of
vertical separation on intervention judgments for the Same heading scenarios, F(2, 26) = 5.41, p =.011, ηp² = 0.29;
for Opposite heading scenarios, F(2, 26) = 5.54, p =.010, ηp² = 0.30; and for the Cross Heading scenarios, F(2, 26) =
2.94, p =.071, ηp² = 0.18. These patterns are similar to those found for risk of conflict judgments; however this effect
of vertical separation on intervention judgments was less than the effect found for conflict risk judgments. Only four
controllers were sensitive to vertical separation in making intervention assessments. This result showed that the
effect of vertical separation is less important on intervention judgments than on conflict risk judgments. This is
consistent with Loft et al. (2009) findings and may attest to the difficulty of vertical speed calculations or estimations
in conflict situations.
Discussion
There are empirical results that support the need for distinguishing between judgments of conflict risk and
intervention decisions. First, we reported at least two recent studies on conflict detection that presented results in
contradiction but that also confirm our hypothesis about of two sub-processes in ATC conflict detection and
avoidance. Loft et al. (2009) showed that conflict detection (intervention decisions) was not affected by variation in
vertical separation between aircraft. Hence, Loft et al. concluded that the controllers’ made no calculations about
vertical distance between aircraft but rather applied safety margins for detecting conflicts. On the other hand,
Stankovic et al. (in press) showed that experienced controllers made calculations of vertical separation for judging
the risk of conflict between aircraft. These two different results are, however, in line with Bisseret’s (1981)
conclusions. Conflict detection implies a conflict risk process which consists of assessment of the future separation
between aircraft mainly based on calculations, or at least more than the intervention decision process which is mainly
based on the conflict risk assessment.
Moreover, the comparison of results reported on conflict risk judgments reported in Stankovic et al. (in
press) with the results on intervention decisions reported above also confirm the existence of two conflict detection
sub-processes. Hence, results on conflict risk judgments showed that controllers took into account vertical separation
between aircraft to judge the risk of conflict between aircraft. Results on intervention judgments showed also an
effect of vertical separation on controller’s intervention ratings; however this effect was reported for only 4
controllers. Controllers also made higher intervention judgments than conflict risk judgments for the same situation.
Latter result shows that controllers made their intervention decision based on conflict risk assessment, but it also
shows that controllers are more cautious when deciding to intervene than when assessing the risk of conflict between
aircraft.
In conclusion, the empirical results reported above confirm Bisseret’s conclusions that controllers are more
interested in overall control task than in accuracy of individual conflict risk judgments, and that experienced
controllers' operative decision process are not be entirely based upon his diagnosis (conflict risk judgment) of the
situation but it is also include the application of safety margins such as Loft et al. (2009) showed. Conflict detection
process implies two sub-processes: (1) a conflict risk judgment process and, (2) an intervention decision process.
Conclusion
This research highlighted the differences between cognitive processes involved in intervention and those
involved in conflict detection. Controllers make more calculations in estimating the risk of conflict between aircraft
than for deciding to intervene in a given situation. As for conflict detection, it seems that intervention operation is
affected by vertical separation between aircraft, thus conflict detection tools which displays pair of aircraft in conflict
and which suggest intervention solution should integrate such differences. This particular result on differences
between conflict detection and intervention processes should be considered for the account of the reason why ATCos
very often do not trust conflict detection tools when completing conflict resolution task.
It may also be argued that conflict avoidance, that is, decisions to intervene in potential conflicts early on,
without careful assessment of the actual conflict risk is part of strategic ATC and an effective means to manage
workload and maintain an accurate picture of the traffic situation. Accurate conflict risk assessment requires
considerable amounts of cognitive (especially attentional) resources that ATCos working busy traffic can ill afford to
trade off against strategic advantages. That experienced controllers exhibit such traits supports this hypothesis.
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The aim of this paper was to clarify the conflict detection process rather than claiming that one method
(conflict risk versus intervention question) is better than another. On the contrary, what it is claimed here is that both
conflict risk judgments and intervention decisions should be considered when studying the conflict detection
processes. For the design of future experimental protocols, distinguishing conflict risk judgments and intervention
decisions is crucial since this clarification should guide researchers for choosing an appropriate method (question
about the risk of conflict or about intervention) for the particular research questions they investigate. Understanding
how expert controllers make conflict detection decisions in air traffic control is also crucial for the design and the
evaluation of the future Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems (Stankovic, Neal & Hasenbosch, 2010). In
particular, when conflict detection tools envisaged in the future ATM systems allocate conflict risk assessments to an
automated system and as a consequence separate conflict risk judgments from intervention decision.
References
Bisseret, A. (1981). Application of Signal Detection Theory to Decision Making in Supervisory Control: the effect of
the Operator’s Experience. Ergonomics, 24, 81-94.
Boag, C., Neal, A., Loft, S., & Halford, G. (2006). An analysis of relational complexity in an air traffic control
conflict detection task. Ergonomics, 14, 1508-1526.
Bouju, F. (1978). Analyse de la prévision de séparation entre deux avions évolutifs convergents [Analysis of the
separation forecast between two converging aircraft] (No. C.O.7802-R54). Toulouse, France: Centre
d’Etudes de la Navigation Aérienne.
Leroux, M. (2000). Cognitive aspects and automation. In N. B. Sarter & R. Amalberti (Eds.), Cognitive engineering
in the aviation domain. (pp. 99-130). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Loft, S., Bolland, S., Humphreys, M. S., & Neal, A. (2009). A theory and model of conflict detection in air traffic
control: Incorporating environmental constraints. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 15, 106124.
Loft, S., Neal., A., & Humphreys, M. S. (2007). The development of a general associative learning account of skill
acquisition in a relative arrival-time judgment task. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, 33, 938-959.
Nunes, A., & Mogford, R. H. (2003). Indentifying controller strategies that support the 'picture'. Paper presented at
the 47th Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, santa Monica, CA.
Neal, A & Kwantes, P. (2009). A random walk model of conflict detection performance in a simulated air traffic
control task. Human Factors, 51, 164-180.
Niessen, C., Eyferth, K. and Bierwagen, T. (1999). Modelling cognitive processes of experienced air traffic
controllers. Ergonomics, 42, 1507-1520.
Rantanen, E. M., & Nunes, A. (2005). Hierarchical conflict detection in air traffic control. International Journal of
Aviation Psychology, 15, 339-362. doi: 10.1207/s15327108ijap1504_3.
Remington, R. W., Johnston, J. C., Ruthruff, E., Gold, M., & Romera, M. (2000). Visual search in complex displays:
Factors affecting conflict detection by air traffic controllers. Human Factors, 42, 349-366.
Stankovic, S., Loft, S., Rantanen., E. M., & Ponomarenko, N., (in press). Individual differences in the effect of
vertical separation on conflict detection in air traffic control. International Journal of Aviation Psychology.
Stankovic, S., Neal, A., & Hasenbosch (2010). A separation assurance model for automation design and evaluation.
Paper presented at HCI-Aero 2010, 3-5 november, Cape Canaveral, FL.
Stankovic, S., Raufaste, E., & Averty, P. (2008). Determinants of Conflict Detection: A Model of risk judgments in
air traffic control. Human Factors, 50, 121-134.
StatSoft (2005). Statistica (Version 7.1). Maisons-Alfort, France: Author. (www.statsoft.fr)

